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The income inequality implications of land reform are examined for the case 
of Georgia using regression-based inequality decomposition techniques. An 
egalitarian land redistribution is likely to equalize per-capita income among 
farm households, implying that continuing the land reform process in 
Georgia is likely to benefit poorer households, relatively speaking. However, 
land fragmentation was found to be disequalizing, and therefore land market 
developments that enable plot consolidation are not less important for 
inequality than the land redistribution itself. Both landholdings and farm 
assets have favorable inequality implications not only through farm income 
but also through non-farm income, implying that these productive assets 
increase the economic opportunities of rural households in the non-farm 
sector as well, perhaps by easing borrowing constraints.  
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 Introduction 
Land reform is intuitively associated with lower income inequality. 
Throughout history, the mere essence of land reforms was to redistribute productive 
assets from the rich to the poor. However, land reforms often involve creating land 
markets, which allow more productive farmers to acquire land from less productive 
farmers. This could lead to higher landholdings inequality and income inequality. On 
top of that, allocating land to poor households in order to increase income is not 
necessarily sufficient. If those households are subject to binding constraints on farm 
credit, market access, knowledge and information, they may not be able to translate 
the newly allocated land into income, consumption and well-being. In this sense, even 
a perfectly egalitarian land redistribution could increase income inequality. 
It is important to understand the inequality implications of land reforms, 
because these reforms are not a one-shot policy. Their implementation may take years, 
and they are not independent of other agricultural and rural policies that target farm 
household income, directly or indirectly (Deininger, 2003). The purpose of this paper 
is to study this issue in the context of Georgia. Georgia is suitable for this purpose 
because despite the fact that land individualization started as early as 1992, not long 
after independence, the implementation of the reform has been slow.F
1
F As of 1995, 
almost 80% of agricultural land was still state-owned (Lerman, 1998). A law enabling 
buying and selling of land was passed in 1996, but the administrative burden of land 
transactions remained high (Csaki and Lerman, 1997). Perhaps this is why the 
structure of agricultural holdings is still over-fragmented (Lerman, 2000). 
                                                 
1  The "Land Privatization Decree" was passed in January 1992, the "Law on Agricultural Land 
Ownership" was passed on March 1996 and amended on May 1997, the "Law on Land Leasing" was 
passed on June 1996, and the "Law on Land Registration" was passed on November 1996 (Lerman et 
al., 2004). 
  1The approach that is taken in this paper is regression-based inequality 
decomposition. This approach encompasses inequality decomposition by income 
sources and by population sub-groups (Cowell and Fiorio, 2009), and can be used to 
simulate the impact of changes in the distribution of landholdings as well as other 
characteristics of the land market on income inequality among the population of farm 
households (Arayama et al., 2006).  
  A description of these decomposition methods is provided in the next section. 
After that, some existing interpretations of these methods are critically discussed. This 
is followed by an empirical study using data collected by means of a farm-household 
survey in Georgia. The last section contains a summary and some concluding 
comments. 
 
Inequality decomposition methods 
 Three  interrelated  inequality decomposition methods are presented in this 
section. The decomposition by income sources measures the impact on inequality of a 
uniform increase in income from a particular source, such as farm income, non-farm 
income, etc. The regression-based decomposition measures the impact on inequality 
of a uniform change in a variable that explains income, such as landholdings, 
education, etc. The third method is combining the first two methods. It is augmenting 
the regression-based decomposition method to the case where explanatory variables 
are allowed to have different impacts on income from different sources. We will now 
explain each of these methods in detail. 
 
  2Decomposition by income sources 
Shorrocks (1982) was the first to offer a unified approach to inequality 
decomposition by income sources. Earlier, Fei et al. (1978) and Pyatt et al. (1980), 
among others, offered a decomposition of the Gini index of inequality by income 
sources, but this happens to be a special case of Shorrocks' (1982) approach. 
Specifically, Shorrocks (1982) suggested focusing on inequality measures that can be 
written as a weighted sum of incomes: 
 
(1)   I(y) = Σiai(y)yi,  
 
where ai are the weights, yi is the income of household i, and y is the vector of 
household incomes. These include as special cases the Gini index as well as the class 
of Generalized Entropy indices. If income is observed as the sum of incomes from k 
different sources, yi=Σkyi









Dividing (2) by (1), one implicitly obtains the "proportional contribution" of income 








  3Shorrocks (1982) noted that the decomposition procedure (3) yields an infinite 
number of potential decomposition rules for each inequality index, because in 
principle, the weights ai(y) can be chosen in numerous ways, so that the proportional 
contribution assigned to any income source can be made to take any value between 
minus and plus infinity. In particular, Shorrocks (1983) used three decomposition 
rules that are commonly used in empirical applications, and are based on the 
following measures of inequality: (a) the Gini index, with ai(y)=2(i-(n+1)/2)/(μn
2), 
where  i is the index of observation after sorting the observations from lowest to 
highest income, n is the number of observations and μis mean income; (b) the 
squared coefficient of variation with ai(y)=(yi-μ)/(nμ
2); and (c) Theil's T index with 
ai(y)=ln(yi/μ)/n/μ. Indeed, several authors (Morduch and Sicular, 2002; Paul, 2004; 
Kimhi, 2007) reported that the decomposition results vary quite a bit across these 
different decomposition rules. 
Podder and Chatterjee (2002) claimed that this is not surprising because it is 
not at all clear what the decomposition results measure and whether results of 
different decomposition rules measure the same quantities. Alternatively, they suggest 
focusing on the inequality elasticities of income sources, which measure the 
percentage change in inequality resulting from a uniform percentage increase in 
income from each source, holding the other sources of income fixed. Shorrocks 
(1983) noted, in this regard, that comparing s
k and α
k, the share of income from source 
k in total income, is useful for knowing whether the k
th income source is equalizing or 
disequalizing. More formally, Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) showed that the elasticity 




which supports the logic of Shorrocks (1983). Paul (2004) derived equivalent 
elasticities for other decomposition rules. These "marginal effects" are more 
  4informative than the proportional contributions to inequality s
k when one wants to 




Morduch and Sicular (2002) and Fields (2003) extended the decomposition 
procedure (3) to a regression-based inequality decomposition by determinants of 
income. They suggested expressing household income (or log-income) as y=Xβ+ε, 
where X is a (nxk) matrix of explanatory variables (including a constant), β is a (kx1) 
vector of coefficients, and ε is a (nx1) vector of random error terms. Given a vector of 
consistently estimated coefficients b, income can be expressed as a sum of predicted 
income and a prediction error as: 
 
(4)  y = Xb+e.
  
 
Substituting (4) into (1) and dividing by (1), the share of inequality attributed to 




F Wan (2004) showed 
that this method can also be applied to nonlinear income-generating equations. Using 
the regression coefficients, it is possible to compute the “income shares” of the 
explanatory variables as α
m = bmΣixi
m/Σiyi, and evaluate the marginal effect on the Gini 
index of inequality of a uniform increase in an explanatory variable m, as in Lerman 
                                                 
2 Morduch and Sicular (2002) suggested a simple procedure to compute standard errors of s
m, 
but the procedure turns out to be incorrect. They claimed that since the components are linear 
in the regression coefficients, i.e. s
m=bmΣiai(y)xi
m/I(y), standard errors can be computed as 
σ(s
m)= σ(bm)Σiai(y)xi
m/I(y). This ignores the fact that Σiai(y)xi
m/I(y) is itself a random variable 
that is not independent of bm (through the dependence of bm on y). Hence the true standard 
errors cannot be computed in such a simple way (which, in fact, results in t-statistics that are 
identical to those of the regression coefficients). As suggested by Cowell and Fiorio (2009), 
bootstrapping is used to obtain standard errors in the empirical application below. 
  5and Yitzhaki (1985), by computing s
m-α
m. Marginal effects for other decomposition 
rules can be computed numerically. 
 
Source-specific regression-based decomposition 
Because certain explanatory variables are associated with specific income 
sources (e.g., land and capital are associated with farm income while education is 
associated with non-farm income), estimating an overall income-generating equation 
as in (4) may be too restrictive. In addition, it might be useful to know to what extent 
given explanatory variables affect income inequality through each of the income 
sources. Arayama et al. (2006) specify the k
th source-specific income-generating 
function as yk =  Xβk+εk, where βk could include zero elements corresponding to 
explanatory variables that do not affect the k’th source of income. Since y = Σkyk , it 
can also be written as y  =  XΣkβk +  Σkεk. Using consistent estimates bk of βk and 
substituting into (1), the proportional contribution of explanatory variable m to overall 









mk is the proportional contribution of explanatory variable m to overall income 
inequality that operates through income source k. 
 
Data 
The data were obtained from a farm-household survey conducted in 2003 in 
four districts surrounding the capital city of Tbilisi: Dusheti, Mtskheta, Sagarejo, and 
Gardabani. The survey included a total of 2,520 individual farms. In each district, ten 
  6villages (Sakrebulos) were selected randomly, and sixty-three households were 
surveyed in each village using the “random walking” procedure.F
3  The survey 
questionnaires were designed to collect information about the demographic profile of 
the household, household income and its sources, land resources and other farm assets, 
farming activity and related activities (finances, investments), and social aspects 
(Gogodze et al. 2008).  
F
                                                
Income was divided into three main components. Farm income was the 
largest component, consisting of almost 70% of total income on average. Non-farm 
income was the second largest component, about a quarter of total income. Other 
income (5.5%) consisted of social assistance payments and private remittances. The 
computation of inequality and its decomposition was performed over per-capita 
annual income, which had a sample mean of 1,226 Lari, equivalent to US$560 at the 
time of the survey. 
 
Results  
Table 1 shows the results of inequality decomposition by income sources, 
based on (3). It is easy to see that farm income, the main single source of income of 
these households, contributed to inequality proportionately more than its income share. 
On the other hand, non-farm income contributed to inequality less than its income 
share, and the same is true for other income. These results are qualitatively consistent 
across the three decomposition rules, although the numbers vary. According to the 
intuition of Shorrocks (1983), this implies that non-farm income and other income are 
equalizing sources of income, while farm income is disequalizing. This can be 
 
3 In principle, the first house in the village is chosen randomly; the interviewer then walks to 
the end of the street, turns right or left at a toss of a coin, and picks the first house on that 
street. 
  7verified by computing the elasticity of inequality with respect to uniform increases in 
each of the income sources, using the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) formula in the case 
of the Gini inequality index, and using numerical derivatives for the other two 
inequality indices.F
4
F The results are in the bottom part of table 1. The three inequality 
indices give qualitatively similar results, confirming the intuitive prediction that a 
uniform increase in farm income increases inequality while a uniform increase in 
either non-farm income or other income reduces inequality. 
The literature shows mixed results with respect to the equalizing role of non-
farm income (Reardon et al., 2000). On one hand, it may improve the income of the 
poor who need it the most. On the other hand, it may benefit those with better labor 
market qualifications and richer households, especially when there are barriers to 
entry into the non-farm sector. Off-farm income was found to be an equalizing 
income source in the U.S. (see El-Osta et al., 1995, and references therein), Egypt 
(Adams, 2001), Taiwan (Chinn, 1979), and the Philippines (Leones and Feldman, 
1998). It was found to be disequalizing in Vietnam (Adger, 1999; Gallup, 2004) and 
Ecuador (Elbers and Lanjouw, 2001). For China, Kung and Lee (2001) found that off-
farm income increased inequality, while Zhu and Luo (2006) found the contrary. de 
Janvri and Sadoulet (2001) found that in Mexico, non-farm income as a whole 
reduced household income inequality, but non-agricultural wages in particular 
increased inequality. Adams (1994) found that in Pakistan, non-farm income as a 
whole was equalizing, but this was mainly due to the impact of unskilled wages, while 
government wages were disequalizing. Canagarajah et al. (2001) found that in Ghana 
and Uganda, non-farm self-employment income was much more disequalizing than 
non-farm wages. Estudillo et al. (2001) found that non-farm income changed from an 
                                                 
4 The analytical elasticities of Paul (2004) came out different from the numerical elasticities, and we 
have more confidence in the numerical elasticities. 
  8equalizing to a disequalizing source as it became a major income source in Philippine 
rice villages. Overall, the evidence varies widely across countries and years. 
  We now move to the regression-based decomposition procedure. The variables 
used to explain per-capita income and their descriptive statistics are presented in table 
2. Age of the head of household and its squared value are included to account for life-
cycle effects. Years of schooling are also included, as well as family size. The 
economic resources of the household are represented by landholdings and the value of 
fixed farm assets (both expressed in log-form, to reduce the impact of outliers), the 
number of plots of land (to account for land fragmentation effects), and a dummy 
variable for households who raise livestock. Livestock is potentially an important 
determinant of farm income, because it is responsible for about two thirds of farm 
income, on average (Gogodze et al, 2008). A dummy variable for Gardabani region is 
also included. Other regional dummies, as well as several other explanatory variables, 
did not come out significant in preliminary regressions and were excluded, without 
significant changes in the results.  
  Table 3 shows the coefficients of the per-capita income generating equation 
(4) and the proportional contributions to inequality of the explanatory variables. All 
regression coefficients are statistically significant and most of them have the expected 
sign. Age has a nonlinear effect, first negative and subsequently positive, on income. 
This is not a common result; perhaps income from sources other than labor is 
increasing with the age of the head of household, or labor income of young household 
members is a dominant source of income. Other coefficients have the expected signs. 
Schooling has a positive effect, while family size has a negative effect. Per-capita 
income is increasing with landholdings, but decreasing with the number of plots, 
indicating that land fragmentation is costly at least in terms of expected income. 
  9Income is higher in households that raise livestock, and is increasing with the value of 
farm assets. Income is higher in Gardabani region than in the neighboring regions. 
Turning to the decomposition results, we note that that Gini and squared CV 
decomposition rules give qualitatively similar results, while the Theil's T 
decomposition rule give very different results. This is in contrast with earlier results 
of Shorrocks (1983) and Morduch and Sicular (2002). For example, the number of 
plots has a negative inequality contribution under the Gini and squared CV 
decomposition rule and a positive inequality contribution under Theil's T 
decomposition rule. On the other hand, the livestock dummy and the value of farm 
assets have positive inequality contributions under the Gini and squared CV 
decomposition rules and negative inequality contributions under Theil's T 
decomposition rule. The regression residuals contribute 65% of income inequality 
under the Gini decomposition rule and 79% of inequality under the squared CV 
decomposition rule. The decomposition results of Theil's T decomposition rule are 
difficult to explain: the intercept, as expected according to Morduch and Sicular 
(2002), has a negative inequality contribution, but its magnitude is suspiciously large. 
The regression residuals, on the other hand, have a positive contribution of more than 
100% of the total. Finally, under both Gini and squared CV decomposition rules, 
landholdings seem to have the largest proportional contribution to inequality among 
the explanatory variables. This is consistent with the fact that landholding is 
particularly important to farm income and that farm income was found to be an 
inequality-increasing income source. 
It can be claimed that the decomposition results are not too informative 
because the explanatory variables account for only 21% to 35% of income inequality. 
However, this is similar to claiming that wage regressions are useless because age and 
  10schooling explain only 10% to 20% of wages. In fact, the results are useful for 
showing how the explained part of income inequality is attributed to the different 
explanatory variables. The empirical results of Morduch and Sicular (2002) showed a 
better fit. Cowell and Jenkins (1995) also found that explanatory variables explained a 
relatively small fraction of income inequality, using two different methodologies.  
We now move to the derivation of marginal effects. Marginal effects of 
explanatory variables are not always interpretable, though, and the logic behind this is 
similar to the case of marginal effects in nonlinear econometric models (i.e. probit). 
An obvious example is the case of age and age squared: one cannot increase one 
without increasing the other, hence marginal effects of age alone or age squared alone 
are meaningless, and one can only use a simulation exercise in which both age and 
age squared are increased. Another case involves dummy explanatory variables such 
as livestock and Gardabani region. These variables only take the values of zero and 
one, and hence one may claim that marginal effects based on percentage changes in 
their values are meaningless. However, a one-percent increase in the value of a 
dummy explanatory variable in an income equation is equivalent to increasing the 
fraction of the population in the selected group (for which the value of the dummy 
variable is one) by one percent without changing the average values of the other 
explanatory variables in that group; hence the conventional marginal effects are still 
useful in this case. Finally, the meaning of percentage changes in integer explanatory 
variables such as schooling, family size, and number of plots could also be challenged. 
The alternative is to use simulations and add one unit to each variable at a time. 
However, for the case of inequality decompositions this is not advised, because 
adding a unit to an explanatory variable changes not only the size of the variable but 
also its distribution (in most cases it would reduce the variance), and hence the 
  11marginal effects derived in this way are not comparable to the marginal effects of 
continuous explanatory variables. We therefore use percentage changes in these 
variables to obtain marginal effects.  
  Therefore, the conventional marginal effects are derived for the present 
empirical application, with the exception of the age variable.F
5
F The results are in table 
4. The marginal effects are mostly consistent in signs and levels of significance across 
the three inequality measures, although the absolute sizes are different. In fact, the 
marginal effects of the squared CV and Theil's T inequality indices are very similar, 
while the marginal effects of the Gini index are about half of those. In particular, the 
results imply that uniform increases in schooling, landholding, raising livestock or 
farm assets reduce income inequality, while uniform increases in family size or 
number of plots increase inequality. The effect of a uniform increase in age on 
inequality is not statistically significant.  
  The largest (in absolute value) marginal effects are related to family size and 
landholding. While family size cannot be altered dramatically by policy measures, at 
least not in the short run, landholding is one of the variables affected by the on-going 
land reform, and hence is of particular interest for this paper. The practical 
interpretation of the negative marginal effect is that an egalitarian (in percentage 
terms) allocation of land from the state to farm households will reduce income 
inequality among farm households. Moreover, a perfectly egalitarian (in absolute 
terms) allocation of land will have an even stronger negative effect on inequality, 
because it will also reduce landholdings inequality. This last corollary stems from the 
positive proportional contribution of landholdings to inequality (table 3). 
                                                 
5  We have also computed marginal effects of adding one unit to the integer explanatory 
variables, and the results were of course quantitatively different, but did not change sign or 
lose significance.  
  12  Another variable that may be related to the land reform is the number of plots. 
The positive marginal effect of the number of plots implies that, holding everything 
else equal, plot consolidation will reduce income inequality among farm households. 
It is not clear whether farmland consolidation may be practically targeted in the 
context of the ongoing land reform process in Georgia, but the adverse inequality 
implications of land fragmentation should definitely be taken into consideration. 
  Some other marginal effects also have interesting policy implications. The 
negative marginal effect of schooling implies that enhancing schooling of the rural 
population in Georgia is likely to have an equalizing effect on income. The same is 
true for farm assets. Increasing farm assets through, for example, extension of credit 
to small farmers, is also likely to reduce income inequality. It is interesting to note 
that the equalizing effects of landholdings and farm assets hold despite the fact that 
landholdings and farm assets operate mostly through farm income, which is 
inequality-increasing. This demonstrates the usefulness and the complementary nature 
of inequality decompositions by income sources and by income determinants. 
  At this point we move to the third and final decomposition exercise, in which 
we differentiate the proportional contributions and marginal effects of explanatory 
variables by income sources. The first step is to estimate source-specific income 
generating equations. The regression results are in table 5. It is evident that the 
coefficients vary considerably by income source. Age and schooling affect non-farm 
and other income significantly, but do not affect farm income significantly. On the 
other hand, the number of plots and the livestock dummy have significant effects only 
on farm income. Interestingly, land and farm assets have significant effects on non-
farm income as well as on farm income, although their effects on non-farm income 
are quantitatively smaller. This implies that farm assets can be utilized to generate 
  13non-farm income, perhaps as collateral to non-farm business loans. Both schooling 
and farm assets have negative effects on other income, perhaps reflecting negative 
wealth and income effects on transfers.  
  The source-specific proportional contributions to inequality are presented in 
table 6. The bottom line shows that almost 90% of the contributions of the 
explanatory variables to income inequality come through farm income. Recalling that 
the proportional contribution of farm income to inequality is only around 75%, this 
implies that the contribution of other income sources operate mostly through the 
unexplained regression residual. Therefore, when we discuss the sensitivity of income 
inequality to changes in the distributions of explanatory variables, we should focus on 
farm income considerations. 
  The source-specific marginal effects of the explanatory variables can be seen 
in table 7. As expected from the discussion above, most of the effects come through 
farm income, with one exception which is schooling. The equalizing effect of 
schooling comes mostly from non-farm income. Schooling also has a negative 
marginal effect through farm income, but it is not statistically significant. The 
marginal effect of schooling through other income is positive and significant, but it is 
small in absolute value compared with the equalizing effects. The marginal effect of 
age through other income is also statistically significant, but negative. Altogether, the 
income source-specific inequality decomposition results do not alter our earlier 
conclusions about the effects of explanatory variables, and landholdings in particular, 
on income inequality. 
  It is interesting to examine the possible changes in the landholdings 
distribution that are needed to increase income inequality. In table 8, we report the 
results of several simulation exercises. We simulate farm income and non-farm 
  14income following particular changes in the landholdings distribution, using the 
source-specific regression results in table 5. We assume that the effect of landholdings 
on other income is zero, given the small and insignificant coefficient of landholdings 
in the other income regression. The first row reports the impact of a one percent 
uniform increase in landholdings, and therefore the results are identical to the 
marginal effects of landholdings in table 7. In the second row, we also add one 
percent of the square of landholdings, and the effect on income inequality remains 
negative and becomes larger in absolute value. Adding a one percent of landholdings 
raised to the third degree (third row) increases inequality through farm income but 
still decreases inequality through non-farm income, making the total effect on 
inequality close to zero. The remaining rows report some sensitivity results around the 
changes made in the third row. The conclusion is that it takes a fairly disequalizing 
change in the landholdings distribution to increase per-capita household income. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
This paper studied the income inequality implications of land reform in 
Georgia. Using regression-based inequality decomposition techniques, the paper 
showed that an egalitarian land redistribution is likely to equalize per-capita income 
among farm households. Even a moderately-disequalizing land redistribution does not 
change this result. This implies that continuing the land reform process in Georgia is 
likely to benefit poorer households, relatively speaking. However, it should be noted 
that land fragmentation has an opposite effect on income inequality. Therefore, the 
favorable inequality implications of land redistribution can be offset unless land plots 
can be consolidated. This requires advances not only in land privatization but also in 
land registration and the overall performance of the land market. 
  15It was also found that a uniform increase in landholdings or in farm assets is 
expected to reduce income inequality not only through farm income but also through 
non-farm income (although to a much lower extent), implying that these productive 
assets increase the economic opportunities of rural households in the non-farm sector 
as well, perhaps by easing borrowing constraints. A uniform increase in schooling is 
also expected to reduce income inequality, but in this case most of the effect comes 
through non-farm income. 
It would be interesting to study, in further research, the inequality implications 
of land reforms in other transition countries as well, especially if longitudinal data can 
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Gini  Squared CV  Theil's T 
___________________________________________________________ 
Inequality index   0.5189  2.5880  0.5729 
        
Proportional contributions   




















100.00 1.0000  1.0000  1.0000 
Inequality changes due to a one percent uniform increase in income (%) 



















* Bootstrapped t-values (200 repetitions) in parentheses. 
 




Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
___________________________________________________________ 
Age 45.165  11.422  20  89 
Schooling (years)  11.735  2.658  0  16 
Family size  3.9377  1.5435  0  12 
ln(land) -0.428  1.0158  -4.6  5.95 
Number of plots  2.4266  1.299  0  8 
Livestock (dummy)  0.8024  0.3983  0  1 
ln(farm assets)  8.0428  3.3806  0  13.6 
Gardabani region (dummy)  0.25  0.4331  0  1 
_________________________________________________________________ 




   Inequality Contribution 
























































































































2,451 “clean” observations. 
t-values in parentheses (asymptotic for the regression coefficients, bootstrapped for 
the inequality contributions). 
R
2=20.6%. 
*   significant at 5%.  
** significant at 1%. 













































































Bootstrapped t-values (200 repetitions) in parentheses. 
a    standard errors of marginal effects of Theil's T inequality index with respect to age 
could not be computed because for some observations the simulations resulted in 
negative incomes. 
b    marginal effects of Theil's T inequality index with respect to family size could not 
be computed because for some observations the simulations resulted in negative 
incomes. 
*    Significant at 5%.  
**  Significant at 1%. 
 































































































2 0.2030 0.0531 0.1128
_______________________________________________________ 
Asymptotic t-values in parentheses. 
*    Significant at 5%.  
**  Significant at 1%. 
 
 





























































































Total explained  0.3136 0. 0257 0. 0100 0.3493 
________________________________________________________________ 
Bootstrapped t-values (200 repetitions) in parentheses. 
*    Significant at 5%.  
**  Significant at 1%. 
 
 























































































Bootstrapped t-values (200 repetitions) in parentheses. 
*    Significant at 5%.  
**  Significant at 1%. 
  27Table 8. Simulated Effects of Changes in Landholdings on the Gini Inequality index 
__________________________________________________________________ 






0.01*land -0.5891  -0.0406  -0.6297 
0.01*land+0.01*land
2  -0.7958 -0.0560  -0.8518 
0.01*land+0.01*land
2+0.01*land
3   0.0235  -0.0209   0.0026 
0.01*land+0.01*land
2+0.008*land
3  -0.0074 -0.0195  -0.0269 
0.01*land+0.01*land
2+0.009*land
3   0.0097  -0.0201  -0.0104 
0.01*land+0.01*land
2+0.011*land
3   0.0347  -0.0218   0.0129 
__________________________________________________________________ 
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